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Whitmore: Colorado

COLORADO

By: Martha Phillips Whitmore
In some respects, the year has been without significant new revisions to the oil and gas law in Colorado. This has been primarily a
year of assimilation and implementation of laws and regulations
passed in 2008, 2009, and early 2010. The following developments
should be noted by those involved with Colorado oil and gas matters.
I.

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS

In San Juan Citizens Alliance v. Stiles, five environmental advocacy
groups ("SJCA") challenged the approval by the U.S. Forest Service
("USFS") and the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") of the
Northern San Juan Basin Coal Bed Methane project ("Project").'
The SJCA alleged that the record of decision ("ROD") was unlawful,
and that the federal defendants had violated the National Forest Management Act ("NFMA") and the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA").2 They alleged that approval of the Project was inconsistent with provisions of the San Juan National Forest Plan ("Forest
Plan") with respect to protecting old-growth ponderosa pines, wildlife
habitats, and riparian areas. They alleged that the approval of the
Project violated NEPA in that the environmental impact statement
("EIS") prepared pursuant to NEPA and assessing the environmental
impacts of the Project did not adequately analyze impacts to the riparian areas, and did not adequately address cumulative impacts, including potential cumulative impacts to air quality and visibility on nearby
1. San Juan Citizens Alliance v. Stiles, 654 F.3d 1038, 1040-41 (10th Cir. 2011).
2. Id. at 1401 (referencing National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1600-1614 (2006); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370
(West 2003 & Supp. 2011)).
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national parks and wilderness areas. The district court had ruled in
favor of USFS and BLM.
The 10th Circuit affirmed in part and remanded in part, agreeing
with the district court that there was no violation of NEPA, but concluding that the challenges based upon violations of NFMA were not
ripe.' The court found that because the Project approval was primarily for a conceptual drilling plan, additional review and approval
would be required for specific well sites. While finding that the ROD
approved five individual wells and denied two others, there was no
evidence that any of these wells were located in riparian areas, in oldgrowth areas of the forest, or in protected habitat areas. Thus, the
court found that "[t]he ROD did not, however, permit commencement of all the proposed construction; it specifically authorized only
five wells. Development of the rest of the Project requires additional
agency action . . . ."4 Because additional approvals would be required

to drill the remaining wells, as well as pipelines and roads requiring
special use permits, the court remanded the case to the district court
to vacate that portion of the judgment pertaining to the NFMA violations and dismiss those claims without prejudice. The 10th Circuit affirmed the district court's order regarding the NEPA claims and
certain NFMA challenges to specific wells.
The Colorado Court of Appeals, in Whiting Oil and Gas Corp. v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., was asked to review an agreement between the
parties to determine whether there had been a material breach of the
agreement and to interpret the Colorado Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities Act ("Act").' The case involved an option to purchase a certain parcel of land. The court affirmed the trial court's determination
that the breaches were not material to the option. In considering
whether the option agreement violated the common law rule against
perpetuities, the trial court found that the option did indeed violate
the common law because it named no life in being and could be exercised more than twenty-one years after the parties entered into the
option agreement. The trial court then applied the Act to reform the
option agreement. On review, the appellate court was asked to determine whether the Act applied beyond probate instruments. The court
concluded that the intent and language of the Act were clear and that
the Act "supersedes and abolishes the rule of the common law known
as the rule against perpetuities." 6 The court found that the General
Assembly limited the types of interests that can be invalidated by the
Act but concluded that as the Act was remedial in nature and was
3. Id. at 1041.

4. Id. at 1044.
5. Whiting Oil & Gas Corp. v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 09CA1081, 2010 WL
3432211, at *1-2 (Colo. App. Sept. 2, 2010), cert. granted, No. 10SC688, 2011 WL
3276261 (Colo. Aug. 1, 2011).
6. Id. at *4.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol18/iss3/7
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V18.I3.6

2

Whitmore: Colorado

COLORADO

2012]

481

intended to give effect to the contractual intent of the parties, application of the Act to the option agreement would merely save the option
agreement from violating the common law rule and did not result in
an unconstitutional and retrospective taking of vested rights.'
In Bledsoe Land Co. v. Forest Oil Corp., the court was asked to
review a dispute alleging violation of an oil and gas lease in which the
trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs whose alleged breach resulted in the termination of a lease.' The lease, entered into in 2001
by the plaintiff with a predecessor of the defendant, was a "Producers
88 - Paid Up" form contract to which had been added several additional lease provisions and exhibits, including legal descriptions of the
property. The lease contained a standard habendum clause setting
forth the duration of the lease and the lessee's interest in the property.
The language in that clause provided for a term of five years from the
date of the lease and continuously after that "so long as operations are
being continuously prosecuted on the leased premises or on acreage
pooled therewith; and operations shall be considered to be continuously prosecuted if not more than ninety (90) days shall elapse between the completion of abandonment of one well and the beginning
of operations for the drilling of a subsequent well." 9
However, Exhibit A to the lease contained a modification of the
habendum clause: "this lease shall not terminate so long as drilling or
reworking operations are being continuously prosecuted if not more
than 180 days shall lapse between the completion of abandonment of
one well and the beginning of operations for the drilling of another
well.""o The plaintiffs alleged that the lease had been breached and
terminated when Forest Oil failed to drill a new well within 180 days
of completion, thus failing to continuously prosecute drilling and reworking operations on the premises.
The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs." Forest Oil appealed on grounds that the trial court misconstrued and misapplied
the terms "completion" and "continuously prosecute."' 2 The court of
appeals agreed, reversing the trial court, and found that the term
"completion" is not ambiguous and, in the context of a Producers-88
oil and gas lease, means that the well is "capable or ready to produce
gas."13 As the term was unambiguous, the trial court erred in hearing
additional testimony on interpretation of the term. The court further
concluded that the well in question was not completed until it was
hydraulically fractured, thus only 176 days had passed between "com7. Id. at *7-8.
8. Bledsoe Land Co., v. Forest Oil Corp., No. 09CA2807, 2011 WL 2474407, at *1
(Colo. App. June 23, 2011).

9. Id. at *1.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
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pletion" of one well and commencement of the next well. The court
also ruled that "continuously prosecuted" in the context of the lease
was defined in Exhibit A as drilling a new well every 180 days, thus
concluding that Forest Oil had not breached the lease by drilling a
new well 176 days after completion of the prior well. The decision has
been appealed and accepted by the Colorado Supreme Court.
An important case ruled on by the Colorado Court of Appeals in
June 2010 has been appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court, with
oral arguments scheduled in November 2011. The issues before the
court in Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission v. Grand

Valley Citizens Alliance are related to who may initiate an adjudicatory hearing before the COGCC.14 In rules promulgated in 2009, the
right to initiate a hearing regarding an application to drill a well
("APD") was limited to the operator, surface owner, relevant local
government, or state environmental agencies. The trial court had held
that the citizens groups who had filed a request for a hearing had no
standing under the regulations and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the COGCC regulations
could not supersede either the Oil and Gas Conservation Act or the
Colorado Administrative Procedures Act, and that the plaintiff citizen
groups were entitled to a hearing under both statutes." The Colorado
Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 21, 2011.
In November 2010, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings the
2009 decision in Gypsum Ranch Co. v. Board of County Commission-

ers.16 In reversing the lower appellate court ruling, the Supreme
Court determined that the court of appeals had misconstrued the law
prior to a 2008 statute regarding acquisition of mineral interests in
land condemned for highway purposes. At issue was whether the Colorado Department of Transportation ("CDOT") had acquired the
mineral interest in land it condemned for a highway in 1975. Gypsum
filed an action to quiet title to the mineral interests, claiming that
CDOT had no statutory authority to acquire mineral interests. The
district court had found that the interest acquired by CDOT was a fee
simple absolute and included the mineral estate. On appeal by Gypsum, the court of appeals reversed the district court. On appeal, the
Supreme Court determined that legislation enacted in 2008 amending
both the eminent domain provisions in Colorado statutes (title 38), as
well as the CDOT statutory authority (title 43), was clear in prohibiting governmental entities from acquiring a right to mineral resources
14. Grand Valley Citizens' Alliance v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n,
No. 09CA1195, 2010 WL 2521747, at *1 (Colo. App. June 24, 2010), cert. granted, No.
10SC532, 2011 WL 976732 (Colo. Mar. 21, 2011).
15. Id. at *1, *5.
16. Gypsum Ranch Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 219 P.3d 365 (Colo. App. 2009),
rev'd sub nom. Dep't of Transp. v. Gypsum Ranch Co., 244 P.3d 127 (Colo. 2010).
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beneath real property that was condemned." The Court rejected the
argument, however, that language in the legislation's title or summary
referring to the intent of the bill as merely clarifying an existing limitation on the condemnation power of governmental agencies was determinative of legislative intention where no language in the body of the
statute contained such a clear statement of intent. The Court further
concluded that the law prior to the 2008 statute was clear in prohibiting acquisition of mineral rights where the land condemned was a
"right-of-way," but was not clear when the title acquired by condemnation was fee simple and concluded that the prior law did not limit
the ability of CDOT to condemn more than easements or to acquire
mineral estates in condemnation for highway purposes. The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings with
respect to other arguments made by the parties that were not addressed by the court of appeals.
In B.P. America Production Co. v. Patterson, the Supreme Court

affirmed the ruling of the court of appeals, which had upheld the ruling of the trial court, that class certification was appropriate.18
II.

REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS

The Colorado State Engineer adopted regulations, as required
under the Colorado Ground Water Management Act, after proceedings commenced in 2009.9 These regulations were required pursuant
to provisions of the Colorado Ground Water Management Act revised
by the General Assembly in 2010.20 In accordance with the Produced
Nontributary Ground Water Rules, petitions have been filed for findings that ground water in various formations and in various parts of
the state are nontributary. All but one of these petitions has been
granted by the State Engineer, with one petition pending as of August
31, 2011. The result of the petitions being granted is that water intercepted in those geologic formations, and in the locations included in
the petitions, is presumed to be nontributary, eliminating a need for
the producer to make an application for water rights or to replace
water withdrawn from the pertinent oil or gas wells.
As in other parts of the country, concerns have been raised by various environmental groups and members of the public regarding the
safety of hydraulic fracturing and potential impact of hydraulic fracturing fluids on water quality. Following Governor Hickenlooper's request in August, the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
has initiated a rulemaking proceeding for the purpose of adopting
17. Dep't of Transp. v. Gypsum Ranch Co., 244 P.3d at 130-31.
18. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Patterson, No. 10SC214, 2011 WL 5120779, at *12 (Colo.
Oct. 31, 2011).
19. COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-17 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-101 (2011).
20. Act of June 2, 2009, sec. 3, 2009 Colo. Sess. Laws 2107, (codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-137(7)(c) (2011)).
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rules governing the public disclosure of hydraulic fracturing chemicals
and notification of hydraulic fracturing operations. The hearing is
scheduled for December 2011.
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